This paper replicates and analyses a study by Hoover and Pecorino (2005) on federal spending in US states. H&P followed on path-breaking research by Atlas et al. (1995) in which evidence was claimed in favour of the "small state effect;" namely, that since every state is represented by two senators, small states have a disproportionate influence relative to their population size. Using H&P's data, we both replicate their results, and demonstrate strong support for the small state effect when we formally test their predictions. The contribution of this study is that we demonstrate that this empirical support vanishes when we (i) employ cluster robust standard errors rather than conventional OLS standard errors, and (ii) include a variable for population growth as suggested in a recent study by Larcinese et al. (2013) . Our results lead us to conclude that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis of a "small state effect."
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper replicates and analyses a study by Hoover and Pecorino (2005) on federal spending in US states. Hoover and Pecorino (2005) , hereafter referred to as "H&P," followed on path-breaking research by Atlas et al. (1995) that claimed evidence in favour of the "small state effect." The small state effect is the hypothesis that, because every state is represented by two U.S. senators, small states should have an influence on federal spending disproportionate to their population size. The challenge with testing this hypothesis is that there is no variation in the number of senators across states, so identification of the effect comes solely from variation in population. However, there are other reasons why population may affect the allocation of federal funds. Consequently, attributing the estimated relationship between senators per capita and state-level federal spending to the "small state effect" is problematic.
H&P suggest a way to overcome this challenge. They hypothesize that if a small state effect exists, then it should be evident in those categories of federal spending where political influence is most likely to be successful. For example, they hypothesize that federal spending on (i) procurement and (ii) grants are likely to be more influenced by senatorial intervention than federal spending on retirement programs such as Social Security. Their empirical evidence is generally supportive, leading them to conclude that political influence from senate representation influences federal spending across states.
The finding is an important one, because it suggests that the allocation of federal funding is significantly affected by constitutional political constraints rather than welfareimproving allocation schemes. Together, the H&P and Atlas et al. studies have been widely influential in the literature. At the time of this writing, they have been cited 10 and 57 times in Web of Science, respectively.
Our study re-analyses the data underlying H&P using a dataset provided to us by its authors, and we are able to closely approximate H&P's results in most respects. Further, we 3 develop statistical tests that provide strong support for their conclusions. Nevertheless we show that two reasonable modifications cause the evidence in favour of the small state effect to vanish. First is the use of clustered robust standard errors. Second is the addition of a variable capturing population growth as suggested by Larcinese et al. (2013) .
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our replication of H&P's results and provides a formal statistical test of H&P's predictions. Section 3 shows the effect on the preceding analysis of two changes: (i) using clustered robust standard errors, and (ii) including a population growth index in the variable specification. Section 4 concludes.
REPLICATION OF HOOVER AND PECORINO (2005)
Description of H&P's main estimating equations. H&P's main estimating equations consist of fixed effects OLS regressions where the dependent variable is state-level, per capita federal spending by budget category. A total of five federal spending categories are investigated: (i) Retirement, (ii) Other, (iii) Wages, (iv) Grants, and (v) Procurement. Each of these categories is described in detail in Table 1 A priori, we expect that grants and procurement are the spending categories which will be most sensitive to our political variables. Our expectations for grants are informed by the previous work of Lee (1998 Lee ( , 2000 . Procurement spending would seem to be particularly sensitive to political factors, as evidenced by numerous anecdotes of intervention by congressional representatives to prevent the Pentagon from killing a weapons project produced in his or her district. Retirement and disability and other direct payments should be least sensitive to our political variables, since they are mainly determined by eligibility factors such as age and income. We expect wages and salaries to be intermediate in the degree to which political variables affect the per capita spending figures. Clearly politics plays a major role in the initial decision about where to locate federal projects and administrative offices which will generate wage and salary payments to federal employees. Because many of these location decisions have a high degree of permanence, much of the political influence may be absorbed by the state fixed effects parameters which are included in our analysis. "…we find the strongest effect in a spending category, procurement, where we expect political factors to play a large role. The next largest effect of senate representation is found in the wages and salaries spending category. Again, this is a category where we would expect politics to play at least a moderately important role. Senate representation also has an effect on grants spending … The effects of senate representation on expenditure are much smaller for retirement spending and the category OTHER. For these categories, we would not expect, a priori, that senate representation would play an important role for spending."
A formal test of the small state effect. Interestingly, H&P do not provide a formal test of their predictions. Indeed, H&P's specification presents a barrier to the formulation of a test 3 We depart slightly from H&P in the calculation of these sensitivities. They divide the coefficient by the mean value of the dependent variable at the end of the sample period (1999). This value is not reported in their paper. They do, however, report sample means for the full sample period (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Accordingly, we use the latter to calculate the values in TABLE 2. 4 See the following: "The coefficient implies than an increase in one senator per million population will raise per capita retirement spending by $120. This represents 6.6% of retirement spending per capita in 1999" (page 103). "The coefficient estimate implies that increasing senate representation by one per million population raises procurement expenditure by $248 per capita. While this would be a very large increase in senate representation, this represents 8% of per capita procurement spending in 1999" (page 103f.). "Our a priori expectation was that GRANTS category would be highly sen-sitive to political variables, and SENATE is significant in this category at the 1% level. The point estimate implies that one more senator per million popula-tion leads to an increase of about $108 in per capita spending. This represents 10.9% of spending in this category. This is larger than the estimated 6.6% increase in retirement spending that would be caused by the same increase in representation" (page 105). "A priori, we expected political influence to be moderately important in the WAGES regression. The SENATE variable is significant at the 1% level and implies that increasing the number of senators by one per million population increases wages and salary expenditures by $173 per capita. This represents about 31% of total per capita wage and salary expenditure… Note, however, that in percentage terms, this is a much larger effect than we observe in retirement spending, where we do not believe that senate representation plays a true role."(page 106). "The category OTHER contains many redistributive spending programs. A priori, we do not expect our political variables to have a very strong influence in predicting these expenditures. The SENATE variable is not statistically significant and has a relatively small point estimate; an increase of one senator per million population raises OTHER spending by 6.9%. This is similar to the estimated effect on retirement spending" (page 106).
statistic. To compare "sensitivities" across spending categories, one must divide the SENATE coefficients by some measure of the respective dependent variables. However, the resulting "sensitivity" values will not be scale invariant, and comparisons across spending categories will depend on the values of the dependent variables that are used.
We solve this problem by replacing the dependent variable with its natural log value.
In this specification, the estimated SENATE coefficients represent the percentage change in the dependent variable corresponding to a unit increase in the SENATE variable. Unlike their H&P analogues, these measures of sensitivity are scale invariant. Differences in sensitivity are thus easily measured by differences in SENATE coefficients across equations. By estimating the five equations as a system using SUR, we can perform statistical tests of H&P's predictions. Population growth. In a recent paper, Larcinese et al. (2013) argue that another confounding factor in the relationship between federal spending in states is population growth. They discuss several reasons why federal spending may be slow to keep up with population growth. If this is the case, fast-growing states will see a decline in their per-capita spending, whereas slow-growing states will see a rise in federal per capita spending. Their argument is both theoretically appealing and empirically well supported.
If population growth is correlated with state size, and these effects differ across spending categories, then the SENATE coefficients and previous tests of H&P's predictions could be biased. Accordingly, we re-estimate the specification of TABLE 3, except that we now add the population growth index POPIND suggested by Larcinese et al. (2013) .
POPIND is calculated as s ,t s ,1983
POPULATION POPULATION , and equals 1 for all states at the beginning of the sample period (1983). According to Larcinese et al. (2013) , POPIND should be negatively associated with federal spending.
We report the corresponding single equation estimates with cluster-robust standard errors in Appendix 1, tables A1 and A2. Two results are noteworthy. First, POPIND is significantly different from zero and the correct sign in at least three of the five spending equations for both specifications. In all cases where it is significant the coefficient is negative, as predicted by Larcinese et al. (2013) . The exception is the OTHER spending category.
Second, the estimated SENATE coefficients are statistically insignificant for all spending categories and both specifications, with several of the coefficient substantially reduced in size in comparison to TABLE 3. These results support the idea that the growth effect may be more important than the small-state effect, and that omitting POPIND may induce omitted variable bias in the SENATE coefficients.
These conclusions are further supported by the tests of the small state effect shown in the bottom panel of TABLE 5. With POPIND in the regression equations, four of the eight coefficient differences are now negative, and none is statistically significant at even the 10 percent level (1-tailed). These results incorporate both best practice in calculating standard errors, and a variable for state-level population growth. The latter variable is both theoretically motivated and empirically supported as an important determinant of state-level federal spending. Accordingly, in our judgment, the results reported in the lower panel of 
CONCLUSION
This study replicates and analyzes research by Hoover and Pecorino (2005) . H&P compare the sensitivity of different types of federal spending to a variable measuring US senators per capita for each state. Based upon previous research and their own understanding of the U.S.
political system, they hypothesize that federal spending at the state level on grants and procurement will be most sensitive, and spending on retirement and disability and other nonretirement transfer programs will be least sensitive to this Senate representation variable.
Using their data, we first broadly replicate their primary results using their regression specification. We then extend their results by using a slight modification of their specification to formally test their predictions regarding the small state effect. Those tests strongly support their conclusions.
We then extend the analysis by demonstrating that this empirical support vanishes when we make two changes to the analysis: (i) we employ cluster robust standard errors rather than conventional OLS standard errors, and (ii) we include a variable for population growth suggested in a recent study by Larcinese et al. (2013 *,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels (2-tailed), respectively. NOTE: Clustered robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. *,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels (2-tailed), respectively. NOTE: Cluster-robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. This is the same specification as TABLE 1, except that the variable POPIND is included. *,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
